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THE EVIDENTIARY WATERSHED:
RECOGNIZING A POST-CONVICTION
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ACCESS DNA
EVIDENCE UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Eric Despotes*
"Our procedure has always been haunted by the ghost of
the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream."
-Judge Learned Hand1
"Today, with the advance of forensic DNA technology, our
desire to join Learned Hand's optimism has given way to the
reality of wrongful convictions-a reality which challenges us
to reaffirm our commitment to the principle that the innocent
should be freed."
-Judge Guido Calabresi 2
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Bruce Godschalk's Story
In 1987, Bruce Godschalk received a sentence of ten to
twenty years imprisonment for the rape of two women that
had occurred the previous year.' A rape test kit examination
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 49; J.D. Candidate, 2009,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., Political Science, California State
University, Long Beach. I would like to thank my family for their unconditional
love and support. I would also like to thank the editors of Santa Clara Law
Review for all their hard work and helpful insight. Finally, thanks to Linda
Starr and the Northern California Innocence Project for inspiring me to write
about this topic.
1. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
2. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007)
(footnotes omitted).
3. Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind:
Factual Innocence and Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547,
547-48 (2002).
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of both victims revealed that the assailant had left residual
traces of semen.4 After Godschalk's sister called police and
informed them that she had seen a police sketch that
resembled her brother, the police questioned Godschalk
regarding the crimes.5  According to police, Godschalk
confessed to the crimes in noncustodial interrogation, under
no pressure or coercion.6 Additionally, when the police
presented a photo lineup to the victims, one of them identified
Godschalk as her assailant.7
Forensic techniques available at the time of trial could
not exclude Godschalk as the assailant.' The prosecutor
secured a conviction by relying on the one victim's
identification testimony and Godschalk's confession, which
was later proven to be false.9 Almost eight years after his
conviction, Godschalk filed a petition in state court for access
to DNA testing and was denied.' Then, in 1995, the
Innocence Project sought testing on Godschalk's behalf, and
was denied." It was not until November of 2000 that a
federal district court finally granted Godschalk access to the
DNA evidence. 12 Due to further legal and procedural hurdles,
the evidence was not tested until January of 2002."3 The test
results excluded Godschalk as the donor of the semen, and he
was released from prison, but not before he had spent seven
of his fifteen years in prison fighting to gain access to the
evidence that would prove to exonerate him. 4
B. The Inadequacy of Traditional Post-Conviction Remedies
and the Emergence of a New Cause of Action
Prisoners seeking access to evidence in the hands of the
government" for the purpose of DNA testing usually have
4. Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Att'y's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d
366, 367 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
5. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 3, at 547.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The Innocence Project, News and Information: Fact Sheets,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/304.php (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).
9. Godschalk, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
10. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 3, at 549.
11. See The Innocence Project, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. "The government" for the purpose of this comment, means any federal,
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several options. First, they can request to have the evidence
turned over. If the government is uncooperative, they can
potentially seek relief through state courts. Forty-four states
now have "DNA access" statutes that allow convicted
prisoners to access evidence for DNA testing under
appropriate circumstances. 16 If that route fails, prisoners can
petition for a writ of habeas corpus or file similar claims for
relief in state courts.17  If state habeas claims are
unsuccessful, prisoners may then be able to file their habeas
claims in federal court if they meet the requisite procedural
requirements. 8
Unfortunately, sometimes even those with the most
compelling claims are denied access to potentially exculpatory
evidence under these traditional avenues of relief.19 Some
state DNA access statutes are unduly burdensome or only
allow access for certain types of crimes or sentences,2 ° and
some states do not have DNA access statutes on their books.21
On the other hand, habeas corpus petitions-especially
federal habeas petitions-are subject to stringent time
limitations,22 and the petitioner must make a very convincing
showing of "actual innocence" for the courts to give his claim
any merit.23 This places the prisoner in a peculiar Catch-22:
the very purpose for which he is seeking access to evidence is
to show that he is "actually innocent," but he may be barred
from accessing the evidence in the first instance because he
cannot make the requisite showing that he is "actually
state, or local entity that retains possession of physical evidence gathered from
the scene of the crime for which the prisoner was convicted. Usually, police
departments, district attorneys' offices, or crime labs retain such evidence. See,
e.g., Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 3, at 554.
16. See The Innocence Project, supra note 8. Six states do not have DNA
access statutes: Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota. Id.
17. See infra notes 42, 48 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 42, 48, 51 and accompanying text.
19. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 3, at 565.
20. See The Innocence Project, supra note 8. For a general overview of state
post-conviction DNA statutes, see National Conference of State Legislatures,
Post-Conviction DNA Motions (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cj/
postconviction.htm.
21. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Herrera v. Collins,
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
2009]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
innocent."24
For these reasons, prisoners have pursued an alternative
remedy: a suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (§ 1983),25
alleging that the government has violated their constitutional
rights by withholding potentially exculpatory evidence.26
Filing a suit under § 1983 is advantageous over other post-
conviction remedies in several ways. A § 1983 plaintiff can
bypass the state courts and proceed directly to federal court;
27
he is not required, as in habeas proceedings, to exhaust other
state remedies before a federal court can hear his § 1983
action.28 Further, he is asserting a constitutional right,
which, if recognized, supersedes conflicting statutory and
common law.29  Thus, if a federal court recognizes a
constitutional right to access evidence post-conviction for
DNA testing, a uniform federal standard will overarch
relevant state statutory and common law within that court's
jurisdiction. 3' The existence of such a right would provide
prisoners who seek to prove their innocence through DNA
testing an important new avenue in the post-conviction
litigation process.
This comment explores the issue of whether there is a
constitutional right to access evidence post-conviction for the
limited purpose of DNA testing, and if so, the scope of that
right. 1 Specifically, this comment focuses on the implications
of recognizing such a right for the purpose of filing a claim
under § 1983.32 This comment will begin with a discussion of
24. See Brief for Appellee at 24, Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist.
v. Osborne, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06 Civ. 35875).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
26. See generally infra Parts II-IV.
27. Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over § 1983 claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) (2006).
28. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973).
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803)
("[T]he particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void . ").
30. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I/), 285 F.3d 298, 299-300 (4th Cir. 2002).
31. See infra Parts lI.C-VI.
32. The recognition of a post-conviction right to access evidence in the
habeas context is outside the scope of this comment. The scope of such a right,
824 [Vol:49
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the interplay between habeas corpus, § 1983, and what can be
termed the "Preiser-Heck" exception,33 which mandates that
certain actions, while technically within the scope of § 1983's
broad remedial power, nevertheless can be brought only as
habeas petitions.3 4 Next, this comment will analyze judicial
treatment of whether § 1983 suits to access DNA evidence fall
within the Preiser-Heck exception.3 5  This will lead into the
underlying constitutional issue of whether there is a post-
conviction right to access DNA evidence. 36  Next will follow
consideration of whether it is prudential to "constitutionalize"
a post-conviction right to access DNA evidence.37  This
comment will then discuss the different ways to characterize
such a constitutional right, and the constitutional "test" for
determining when such a right is actionable. 3' Finally, this
comment proposes a solution to the legal problem, by
articulating the best constitutional argument for recognizing
a post-conviction right to access DNA evidence, and the
applicable test that should govern when the right is
actionable.39
II. THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD
A. Habeas Corpus, § 1983, and the Preiser-Heck Doctrine as
a Restriction upon Certain § 1983 Suits
The two primary avenues of relief to prisoners seeking
redress for constitutional injury are a civil rights claim under
§ 198340 and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.41 Both
if one exists, may be similar, if not identical in certain circumstances, to the
right with respect to filing an actionable claim under § 1983. But this comment
highlights the use of § 1983 as a means to compel the government to provide
access to evidence within its possession for DNA testing. This is significant
because, if such evidence turns out to be exculpatory, the prisoner may then use
it as a foundation to file a habeas petition in the future, quite possibly alleging a
different constitutional violation altogether.
33. Derived from the United States Supreme Court decisions in Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
34. See discussion infra Part II.A.
35. See discussion infra Part II.B.
36. See discussion infra Parts II.C, III.
37. See discussion infra Part [V.A.
38. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-C.
39. See infra Part V.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
41. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994).
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provide access to federal court 42 to litigate constitutional
claims against state officials, but they differ in scope and
operation. 3 Section 1983 provides civil redress for violations
of constitutional or other federal rights4" in the form of
damages or other injunctive relief.4 ' Habeas corpus, on the
other hand, is the exclusive remedy where the petitioner
challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks
immediate or speedier release." From a practical standpoint,
bringing a § 1983 action in federal court is easier than
bringing a federal habeas petition in several respects. First,
a state prisoner normally is required to exhaust state
remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal court. 48
Under § 1983, prisoners generally are not required to exhaust
state remedies.4 9  Second, under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),5 ° federal
habeas petitions are subject to much stricter time limitations
and rules against successive filings than are § 1983 actions. 1
42. Prisoners must first file petitions of habeas corpus in state court and
exhaust their remedies in state court before filing a petition of habeas corpus in
federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)-(b)(1)(A) (2006). Federal courts have
jurisdiction to consider petitions of habeas corpus, under appropriate
circumstances, pursuant to § 2254. § 2254(a)-(b). Discussion of substantive
and procedural standards underlying habeas corpus proceedings is largely
outside the scope of this comment.
43. Heck, 512 U.S. at 480.
44. Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress .... .
45. See, e.g., McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir.
2007); Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne 1), 423
F.3d 1050, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2005).
46. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481.
47. See McKithen 1, 481 F.3d at 100.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838,
845 (1999) ("[Sltate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to
resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's
established appellate review process.").
49. See, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1982).
50. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(2006).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA provides a one-year limitation period in
which to file a habeas petition in federal court after state remedies have been
exhausted. Id. AEDPA also generally prohibits successive habeas claims in
federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(2).
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Therefore, suits which may be procedurally barred by the
more stringent federal habeas requirements still may be
brought as § 1983 actions.52  Ultimately then, "prisoners
suing under § 1983 'generally face a substantially lower gate'
than those prisoners petitioning for habeas."53 So it follows
that prisoners seeking access to DNA evidence will generally
prefer to do so by way of a § 1983 suit rather than a habeas
petition.54
The line between § 1983 suits and habeas petitions is not
always clearly drawn, however, and the two remedies are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.5  As a result, the United
States Supreme Court has "attempted to harmonize the broad
language of § 1983, a general statute, with the specific federal
habeas corpus statute." 6 Under a line of cases that began
with Preiser v. Rodriguez,57 the Supreme Court has held that
prisoners must bring certain claims as habeas petitions, and
cannot bring them as § 1983 claims, even though they would
otherwise come within the scope of § 1983.8
In Preiser, several state prisoners brought civil rights
actions under § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of
prison disciplinary proceedings that had deprived them of
their good-conduct time credits.5 9  The prisoners sought
injunctive relief that would restore their time credits and
result in their immediate release from prison.60 The prisoners
argued that, although they could have brought their claims as
habeas petitions, they could also properly proceed under §
1983, since their complaints "plainly came within the terms of
that statute. '61  The Court stated that the issue was not
whether the prisoners' claims came within the literal
52. See, e.g., McKithen 1, 481 F.3d at 100. In § 1983 actions, federal courts
apply the statute of limitations of the state in which they sit. See id.
53. Id. (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per
curiam)).
54. See discussion infra Part II.B (analyzing the split in authority regarding
whether claims of access to DNA evidence can be brought as § 1983 suits).
55. See Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2004).
56. Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne ), 423
F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 491
(1994)).
57. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
58. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 481; see also McKithen I, 481 F.3d at 99.
59. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 476.
60. Id. at 476-77.
61. Id. at 488.
20091 827
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language of § 1983, but whether § 1983 was an appropriate
alternative to habeas corpus where a favorable outcome
would result in the prisoners' release from confinement. 62 It
held that in situations where there is a potential overlap
between § 1983 and the habeas statute, "when a state
prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole remedy is a
writ of habeas corpus."63
More than twenty years later, in Heck v. Humphrey, the
Supreme Court articulated what has become known as the
"favorable termination requirement."64 The Court held that
where a prisoner's § 1983 action, if successful, would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,
it must be dismissed unless he can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has been invalidated already.65
Conversely, if a successful § 1983 suit would not necessarily
imply the invalidity of the underlying conviction or sentence,
then it may proceed, absent some independent bar to the
suit.66
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia included two
footnotes to help clarify when a successful § 1983 suit would
necessarily invalidate the underlying conviction and when it
would not.67 In the former category, he described a situation
in which a defendant is convicted and sentenced for resisting
arrest (i.e., intentionally preventing a peace officer from
effecting a lawful arrest) and he subsequently brings a § 1983
action, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable seizure.66 Since success in the §
1983 action would require negating an element of the
criminal offense and would therefore invalidate the
underlying conviction, a § 1983 action would not be
62. See id. at 489, 500.
63. Id. at 489.
64. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994); see also Osborne v. Dist.
Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne 1), 423 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir.
2005).
65. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487-88.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 487 nn.6-7.
68. Id. at 487 n.6.
828 [Vol:49
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appropriate.69 On the other hand, a § 1983 suit would be
appropriate where the suit is for damages attributable to an
allegedly unreasonable search, even if the search produced
evidence that was introduced in a criminal trial.7" Because of
doctrines such as harmless error, inevitable discovery, and
independent source, "a § 1983 action, even if successful,
would not necessarily imply that the plaintiffs conviction was
unlawful."7' Thus, "defendants are not prohibited from
bringing § 1983 actions that increase their likelihood of
gaining release, as long as they do not 'necessarily' vitiate the
legality of their current confinement."72
Most recently, in Wilkinson v. Dotson,73 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that the proper inquiry under the Preiser-
Heck line of cases was whether a victorious § 1983 claim
would necessarily equate to immediate release from prison or
a shorter prison term.74  The Court noted that it was
irrelevant whether a successful § 1983 plaintiff would
subsequently find himself in a better position to launch future
attacks on his underlying conviction or sentence. 75  Thus,
Heck only applies to situations in which the prisoner's § 1983
claims go to the "core" of habeas relief.76  Heck is not
implicated when a plaintiff simply uses the fruits of his §
1983 success in subsequent litigation-this situation is
outside the "core" of habeas relief that Heck sought to protect
from a collateral § 1983 attack.77
The Supreme Court's articulation of the Preiser-Heck
analysis can be summarized as follows: "the Court has
focused on the need to ensure that state prisoners use only
habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to
invalidate the duration of their confinement-either directly
through an injunction compelling speedier release or
indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily
69. Id.
70. Id. at 487 n.7.
71. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994)
72. Wade v. Brady, F. Supp. 2d 226, 238 (D. Mass. 2006).
73. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
74. Id. at 80; see McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir.
2007) ("[W]e were careful in Heck to stress the importance of the term
'necessarily.'") (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)).
75. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 80.
76. Id. at 83.
77. See id. at 82.
20091 829
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implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.""8 Within
this framework, the question is whether or not a § 1983 claim
for post-conviction access to DNA evidence is within the "core"
of habeas relief.
B. The Threshold Inquiry: The Appropriateness of Seeking
Access to DNA Evidence under § 1983
When a § 1983 plaintiff is seeking an injunction against
the government compelling access to DNA evidence, a court
must determine whether § 1983 is an appropriate alternative
to habeas corpus relief before it can reach the merits of the
plaintiffs underlying constitutional claim. "9 In other words,
the threshold procedural question"° is whether a successful §
1983 suit asserting a post-conviction right to evidence for the
purpose of DNA testing "necessarily implies" the invalidity of
the underlying conviction."1 The courts that have definitively
ruled on this issue are split, but the weight of authority tips
in favor for allowing such § 1983 actions to proceed. 2
1. The Argument for Prohibiting Suits Claiming a Post-
Conviction Right to DNA Evidence under § 1983
In Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I), James Harvey, a Virginia
state prisoner, sought a constitutional right of access to DNA
78. Id. at 81.
79. See, e.g., Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II) 285 F.3d 298, 307-08 (4th Cir.
2002) (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
80. There are other procedural barriers that may prevent a court from
addressing a § 1983 plaintiffs underlying claim. Federal abstention, see
Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District (Osborne II),
521 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008), the
"Rooker-Feldman doctrine," see Thames v. L.A. Police Department, No. CV 08-
1044-RGK(MLG), 2008 WL 2641361 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2008), and collateral
estoppel, see Osborne 11, 521 F.3d at 1134-35, are a few examples. Discussion of
these and other doctrines is outside the scope of this comment.
81. See, e.g., Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340-41 (5th Cir.
2002); Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 307.
82. Among the federal circuit courts, the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have answered this inquiry in the affirmative. See McKithen
v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d
667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006); Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist.
(Osborne 1), 423 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005); Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d
1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2002). The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have
answered in the negative. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 374
(4th Cir. 2002); Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 340-41; Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340,
340 (6th Cir. 2002).
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evidence under § 1983.3 The district court granted summary
judgment in Harvey's favor, concluding that Harvey's claim
was not, in effect, a petition for writ of habeas corpus because
he was not seeking immediate release from prison or
challenging his conviction. 4 The district court also concluded
that Harvey had a due process right of access to the DNA
evidence he sought.8" The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that Harvey had failed to state a claim under § 1983 because
by seeking access to biological evidence he was "challeng[ing]
the fact or duration of his confinement." 6 Citing Heck, 7 the
court reasoned that "Harvey is seeking access to DNA
evidence for one reason and one reason only-as a first step
in undermining his conviction."88  Hence, since Harvey
believed that the DNA results would have been favorable, and
would have allowed him to bring subsequent litigation to
invalidate his conviction, "an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
[could not] lie."89
Harvey filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc.90 The Fourth Circuit denied the petition in Harvey v.
Horan (Harvey M).9 Judge Luttig wrote a concurring opinion
in Harvey II vociferously criticizing Judge Wilkinson's
majority opinion in Harvey 1.92 Importantly, Judge Luttig
pointed out that Judge Wilkinson seemed to conflate the
procedural question under Heck with Harvey's underlying
constitutional claim. 93  Judge Wilkinson stated "[t]he
implications of circumventing Heck are no small matter.
Harvey would have this court fashion a substantive right to
post-conviction DNA testing out of whole cloth or the vague
83. Harvey I, 278 F.3d at 372.
84. Harvey v. Horan, 119 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (E.D. Va. 2000); Harvey v.
Horan, No. Civ. A. 00-1123 A, 2001 WL 419142 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2001),
overruled by Harvey I, 278 F.3d at 381.
85. See Harvey, 2001 WL 419142, at *5. Parts II.B-VI of this comment are
devoted to the substantive constitutional question of post-conviction access to
DNA evidence.
86. Harvey I, 278 F.3d at 374-75.
87. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
88. Harvey I, 278 F.3d at 375.
89. Id.
90. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 304-26.
93. Id. at 322.
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contours of the Due Process Clause."94 Judge Luttig argued
that the court in Harvey I never should have discussed the
merits of Harvey's constitutional claim, because it concluded
that he failed to state a cause of action under § 1983. 91 He
pointed out that:
[T]he majority appear[ed] to believe that to resolve the
issue under Heck [was] to resolve the ultimate question of
whether there is or is not a right under the Constitution to
access evidence post-conviction for purposes of DNA
testing. Of course, such would be to mistake Heck's
holding with respect to cognizance as, instead, a holding
with respect to ultimate constitutional right.96
However, despite Judge Wilkinson's potentially flawed
analysis, the law in the Fourth Circuit holds that a claim of
post-conviction access to DNA evidence is not cognizable
under § 1983.97
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have joined the Fourth
Circuit in holding that a post-conviction claim to access DNA
evidence cannot be brought under § 1983. 91 While neither
court did much to expand upon the reasoning in Harvey I,
each court briefly touched upon the interplay between § 1983
relief and habeas relief.99 In Kutzner v. Montgomery County,
the Fifth Circuit held that claims which are "so intertwined"
with attacks on confinement are effectively transformed from
§ 1983 claims to habeas corpus petitions,"' while in Boyle v.
Mayer, the Sixth Circuit stated that even though the plaintiff
had no other available remedy other than § 1983, "Heck is not
made inapplicable . . . by the unavailability of habeas
94. Harvey I, 278 F.3d at 375. Indeed, the court in Harvey I devoted a large
portion of its opinion to addressing the underlying constitutional question. See
id. at 375-79. In Harvey II, Judge Luttig noted that while the Harvey I
majority's entire discussion of the underlying constitutional claim is dicta, he
would not "in the face of the majority's clear, repeated, and unequivocal
statements" hold in the future that there is a post-conviction right of access to
evidence for purposes of DNA testing. Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 312 n.3.
95. See Harvey II, 285 F.3d at 323.
96. Id. at 322 n.9.
97. See Harvey 1, 278 F.3d at 372-73.
98. Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2002);
Boyle v. Mayer, 46 F. App'x 340, 340 (6th Cir. 2002).
99. See Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 341; Boyle, 46 F. App'x at 340.
100. Kutzner, 303 F.3d at 341. According to the court, such claims "require
habeas corpus treatment," meaning that they are subject to general habeas
procedural and substantive standards. See id.
832 [Vol:49
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relief."1"' Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit hinted that it would
be unwilling to recognize an underlying constitutional
violation under § 1983 when it stated, "Boyle has not raised a
cognizable issue under § 1983 insofar as his claims do not
implicate the validity of his convictions, as such claims would
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation."0 2
In sum, the courts that have not recognized post-
conviction access to DNA evidence as a cognizable claim
under § 1983 have relied upon Judge Wilkinson's
interpretation of Heck in Harvey I. On the other hand, courts
that have been willing to recognize post-conviction access to
DNA evidence as a cognizable claim under § 1983 have relied
upon Judge Luttig's concurrence in Harvey I.
2. The Argument for Allowing Suits Claiming Post-
Conviction Right to DNA Evidence under § 1983
In Harvey II, Judge Luttig filed a concurring opinion
respecting the denial of rehearing en banc even though he
strongly disagreed with the majority's rationale in Harvey
J.103 The case was moot by that point because Harvey had
already obtained access to the DNA evidence through
Virginia state court."0 4 Judge Luttig's concurrence in Harvey
II echoed Judge King's concurrence in Harvey I,105 insofar as
both disagreed with the majority's Heck analysis as to
whether a post-conviction right of access to DNA evidence is
cognizable under § 1983.106
Judge Luttig emphasized that Heck is "actually a quite
narrow decision," and does not apply in situations where the
plaintiff might use a successful § 1983 suit as a basis for
future litigation.0 7 If the plaintiff wins his § 1983 suit and
101. Boyle, 46 F. App'x at 340 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
102. Id. The Sixth Circuit made its unwillingness to find a constitutional
right to post-conviction access to DNA evidence explicit in Alley v. Key. Alley v.
Key, No. 06-5552, 2006 WL 1313364, at *1-2 (6th Cir. May 14, 2006).
103. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II) 285 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,
J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
104. Id. at 298 (majority opinion).
105. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 381-82 (4th Cir. 2002)
(King, J., concurring) (arguing that Harvey had stated a cognizable claim under
§ 1983).
106. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 304-11 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of
rehearing en banc); Harvey I, 278 F.3d at 370.
107. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 308 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing
en banc).
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gets access to the evidence, it does not "necessarily imply" the
invalidity of his underlying conviction.0' The results of any
DNA tests that are performed may be exculpatory,
inconclusive, or even inculpatory.0 9 Furthermore, even if the
results are exculpatory, "the petitioner would have to initiate
an entirely separate action at some future date, in which he
would have to argue for his release upon the basis of a
separate constitutional violation altogether."110  For these
reasons, Judge Luttig concluded "it [is not] even arguable
that a post-conviction action merely to permit access to
evidence" for the purpose of DNA testing is cognizable under
§ 1983.111
Since Harvey 11, the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted Judge Luttig's position,
holding that a post-conviction claim to access DNA evidence
may proceed under § 1983.112 Furthermore, several federal
district courts have since recognized such a cause of action
under § 1983."'
It may not be a coincidence that most of these cases were
handed down after the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson
v. Dotson."4  In Wilkinson, Justice Breyer implicitly agreed
with Judge Luttig's analysis-without explicitly saying it-by
emphasizing that the plaintiffs motives in bringing a § 1983
suit are irrelevant, as is the possibility that he will use a §
1983 suit as a basis for attacking his confinement in the
future."' Thus, the fact that "in all likelihood the prisoners
hope these actions will help bring about earlier release" does
not mean that habeas is their sole avenue for relief.116 Still,
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007); Savory
v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2006); Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for
the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne I), 423 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005); Bradley v.
Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2002).
113. See, e.g., Breest v. N.H. Att'y Gen., 472 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.N.H.
2007); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 239 (D. Mass. 2006); Derrickson v.
Del. County Dist. Att'y's Office, No. 04-1569, 2006 WL 2135854, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
July 26, 2006).
114. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005). See discussion of Wilkinson,
supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
115. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78, 82.
116. Id. at 78.
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the factual context in Wilkinson was slightly different; the
Supreme Court will soon address the issue of whether a
prisoner's claim seeking access to DNA evidence is cognizable
under § 1983.117
A majority of federal circuit courts now hold that a § 1983
plaintiff may bring a constitutional claim seeking post-
conviction access to DNA evidence. 118 In light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson, those courts that
have not ruled definitively on the issue will likely join the
Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding
that such a cause of action may proceed under § 1983.119
Therefore, as Judge Luttig predicted in Harvey II, more
courts will begin to grapple with the underlying
constitutional question that is the focus of the remainder of
this comment: whether there is a constitutional post-
conviction right to access evidence for the purpose of DNA
testing, and if so, when that right may be asserted. 120
C. Past the Procedural Threshold: Addressing the Merits of
a Constitutional Claim to Access DNA Evidence Post-
Conviction
Once a jurisdiction has determined that a claimant
seeking post-conviction access to evidence may proceed under
§ 1983, it then must address the underlying substantive
claim: the plaintiffs assertion that, by denying him access to
the evidence that he seeks to perform DNA testing, the
government has violated his constitutional rights. 21 The
Ninth Circuit, 22 and some lower courts, to varying extents,
have recognized the right. 23  On the other side, the Sixth
117. After the Second Circuit recognized such a cause of action in McKithen I,
they remanded to the district court to consider the plaintiffs substantive
constitutional claims. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 108 (2d
Cir. 2007). However, before the district court could consider the substantive
claims, the appellees filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
which was denied. Brown v. McKithen, 128 S. Ct. 1218 (2008).
118. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117.
120. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 306-07 (4th Cir. 2002)
(Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) ("[T]hese questions cannot
long be avoided, now that the science is available.").
121. See, e.g., id. at 306-07.
122. Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne 1I), 521
F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008).
123. See, e.g., Breest v. N.H. Att'y Gen., 472 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.N.H.
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Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed a district court
determination that no general constitutional right to "post-
judgment DNA testing" exists. 24  The Fourth Circuit
seemingly came to the same conclusion, but its discussion of
the precise constitutional issue was arguably dicta and thus
may not foreclose the possibility of a different result in the
future. 125 Still, other courts have touched upon the issue, but,
given the respective postures of the cases as presented, would
not or could not definitively rule one way or the other. 126
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, although appearing hesitant to
recognize a general constitutional right to access evidence
post-conviction, "[did] not foreclose the possibility that a §
1983 plaintiff could, under some extraordinary circumstances,
be entitled to post-conviction access to biological evidence for
the purpose of performing DNA testing."' 21
Courts are not only split as to whether there is a general
constitutional right to post-conviction access to evidence for
DNA testing; their views also differ as to where in the
Constitution the right is derived and the scope and
limitations of such a right. Most courts that have recognized
the right have begun their analysis by analogizing to the due
process requirements of Brady v. Maryland,121 which requires
the government to produce all potentially exculpatory
evidence to ensure that the defendant's trial is fair. 2 9
Although the Brady requirements have traditionally been
2007); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass. 2006); Godschalk v.
Montgomery County Dist. Att'y's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
124. Alley v. Key, No. 06-5552, 2006 WL 1313364, at*2 (6th Cir. May 14,
2006).
125. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
126. E.g., Bryson v. Gonzales, 534 F.3d 1282, 1287 (10th Cir. 2008)
(dismissing petitioner's complaint on other grounds); McKithen v. Brown
(McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding to the district court to
consider the "extraordinarily important, and delicate" constitutional issue in the
first instance); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding no
need to decide constitutional issue because appellant's claims were not timely);
Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne /), 423 F.3d
1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (remanding constitutional question to district court
to address in the first instance); Moore v. Lockyer, No. C 04-1952 MHP, 2005
WL 2334350, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005) (discussing constitutional issue
but case decided on other grounds).
127. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1339 (11th Cir. 2006).
128. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
129. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 316 (4th. Cir. 2002)
(Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
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interpreted as trial rights, the "same motivations
undergirding Brady, the desire to avoid wrongful convictions
by providing access to evidence in the prosecutor's
possession," arguably apply in the post-conviction context as
well.'30  Along a similar line of reasoning, courts have
analyzed the § 1983 plaintiffs procedural due process rights
under the framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge.131
Under Mathews, "identification of the specific dictates of due
process" generally requires balancing three factors: the
private interests that will be affected by state action; the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through the
procedures used, including the probative value of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government's
interest, taking into account the additional fiscal and
administrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards
would entail.'32 The Mathews factors are used to analyze
whether government procedures are sufficiently adequate to
protect the plaintiffs substantive rights. 133
Next, courts have discussed a § 1983 plaintiffs claim in
terms of substantive due process, one of the most subjective
and controversial areas of constitutional law.'34 Substantive
due process bars certain arbitrary government actions,
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them. 35 A § 1983 plaintiff may argue that by denying access
to evidence when the plaintiff only seeks to perform DNA
testing, the government is acting in a wholly arbitrary
manner, and thus in violation of due process. 36 Finally, as a
corollary to procedural and substantive due process rights,
some courts have given credence to the argument that by
130. Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 243 (D. Mass. 2006).
131. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See, e.g., Harvey 11, 285 F.3d
at 315; McKithen v. Brown (McKithen If), 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443 (E.D.N.Y.
2008); Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 226.
132. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
133. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
134. See, e.g., McKithen I, 481 F.3d at 107 n.17; Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 318-
19.
135. Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 318 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)).
136. See Brief for Appellee at 27-32, Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud.
Dist. v. Osborne, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06 Civ. 35875) (citing
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1988); Moore v. Lockyer, No.
C 04-1952 MHP, 2005 WL 2334350 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2005)).
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denying access to evidence, the government is
unconstitutionally denying meaningful access to the courts."7
Courts squarely addressing the issue may find the
constitutional right in some or all of the above mentioned
sources, or they may be unconvinced that any constitutional
right to access evidence post-conviction exists at all.13
Undeniably though, if a constitutional right exists to access
evidence post-conviction, it must be conscribed to eliminate
frivolous claims and to reflect the reality that the criminal
justice system has an interest in preserving the finality of its
judgments. 39  Therefore, courts must address not only
whether there is a constitutional right in the first instance,
they must also balance the interests of the prisoner against
the interests of the government to determine when such a
right becomes actionable.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
Due process jurisprudence is vast and amorphous. With
the relative novelty of DNA evidence, § 1983 claimants must
articulate novel arguments that emphasize the pervasive and
fundamental nature of due process in the American legal
system. The remainder of this comment specifically focuses
on whether a § 1983 plaintiff can fit his claim of post-
conviction access to DNA evidence into one or more
recognized due process concepts. This requires engaging in
essentially a three step inquiry.
First, is it prudential for courts to engage in the
"conversation-stopping process" of constitutionalizing a right
to access evidence post conviction, or are state legislatures
and Congress better equipped to determine the circumstances
under which prisoners may access such evidence? 4 °
Answering this question requires an assessment of the role
courts should play vis-A-vis lawmakers. On one hand,
federal-state comity may dictate that state legislatures
should be able to preserve the legitimacy of their criminal
judgments and define the circumstances under which they
may be collaterally attacked.' Furthermore, legislatures
137. See, e.g., Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d. at 249-51.
138. See generally infra Parts III-IV.
139. See generally infra Parts III-IV.
140. See generally infra Part IV.
141. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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may be better able to wrestle out the thorny questions that
may arise when a prisoner seeks access to evidence after
conviction. 4 2  On the other hand, prisoners throughout the
country do not have uniform ability to access potentially
exculpatory evidence, and some prisoners with truly
meritorious claims may have no other means of recourse. 4 3
In considering whether to constitutionalize a right to access
evidence post-conviction, courts must balance concerns of
federalism with interests in vindicating individual rights.'"
Next, what is the most apt constitutional argument for
recognizing a post-conviction right to access evidence? Most
commonly, § 1983 plaintiffs seek to extend the rule in Brady
v. Maryland to the post-conviction context.1 45 Also, a § 1983
plaintiff may seek to establish a procedural due process right
under Mathews v. Eldridge, concurrently arguing that he has
a substantive due process right-a "fundamental" right-to
access evidence post-conviction for DNA testing.' 46
Finally, what might be the constitutional scope of such a
right-what is the "test" for determining when a prisoner's
constitutional rights have been violated? In this context,
prisoners again have relied upon Brady v. Maryland and its
"materiality" standard, which requires the prosecutor to turn
over "material" exculpatory evidence to the defendant. 47 At
least one court has hinted that the materiality test may be
the outer limit of a constitutional right to access evidence
post-conviction,141 while others have intimated that the right
should be "very narrowly confined," 149 or should be limited
only to "extraordinary circumstances."'50
Given the now vital role that DNA technology plays in
the criminal justice system, courts will continue to grapple
with these questions. As with the development of other
subjective areas of constitutional law, different courts will
142. See discussion infra Part W.A.
143. See discussion infra Part W.A.
144. See discussion infra Part V.A.
145. See supra Part IIC; infra Part IV.B.2.
146. See supra Part IIC; infra Parts IV.B.3-4.
147. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.2, IV.C.
148. Moore v. Lockyer, No. C 04-1952 MHP, 2005 WL 2334350, at *9 (N.D.
Cal. Sep. 23, 2005).
149. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 321 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,
J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
150. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1339 (11th Cir. 2006).
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reach different conclusions. The implications of recognizing a
constitutional right to access evidence post-conviction for
DNA testing undoubtedly will have a large impact on the
criminal justice system. It will provide a significant new
avenue for prisoners to attack their convictions, 151 especially
in cases where convictions were based primarily upon older
and ostensibly less reliable science. It may also place
considerable burden on state and local governments, who
would have to, at minimum, bear the administrative costs of
preserving and turning over evidence. Moreover, in some
cases, state and local governments would likely have to pay
for the DNA testing itself.'52 For these reasons, the legal
community will be affected substantially by the development
of this "extraordinarily important, and delicate, constitutional
issue."'53  The remainder of this comment will focus on
analyzing a § 1983 plaintiffs claim of a constitutional right to
access evidence post-conviction for the purpose of DNA
testing. 154
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutionalizing the Right to Access Evidence Post-
Conviction for Purposes of DNA Testing
As courts begin to address squarely the issue of whether
a constitutional right exists to access evidence post-conviction
for the purpose of DNA testing, a primary issue will be
whether courts should undertake the subjective process of
"constitutionalization" at all, or whether they should leave
the task to state legislatures to create laws that allow for
post-conviction DNA testing.155 Indeed, no matter what one's
151. See discussion supra Parts IB, II.A.
152. Surely, recognizing a constitutional right to access evidence post-
conviction would raise these types of collateral issues. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d
at 300-01. Although resolving these types of concerns is largely outside the
scope of this comment, they are important factors to consider in evaluating the
scope of the right. See id.; see also Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third
Jud. Dist., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081-82 (D. Alaska 2006) (recognizing a "very
limited constitutional right to the testing sought," the court considered it
significant that the testing could be easily performed without cost or prejudice
to the government).
153. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 106 (2d Cir. 2007).
154. See infra Parts IV-VI.
155. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 300 (discussing how attempting to fashion a
novel due process right in the courts will create intractable problems that are
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views are about the proper role of courts in American society,
"fashion[ing] a substantive right to post-conviction DNA
testing out of whole cloth or the vague contours of the Due
Process Clause" is no easy task. 1 6  It would mean federal
judges would have to superimpose their own value judgments
upon those of Congress and state legislatures. Nevertheless,
as Justice Marshall famously said, "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is[,]" and if both the law and the Constitution apply to a
particular case, the Constitution must govern.
157
1. The Argument for Judicial Restraint
Those against constitutionalizing a right of access to
evidence post-conviction argue that "[elstablishing a
constitutional due process right under § 1983 to retest
evidence with each forward step in forensic science would
leave perfectly valid judgments in a perpetually unsettled
state."1 8 In McCleskey v. Zant,59 the Supreme Court stated
that "[o]ne of the law's very objects is the finality of its
judgments."6 ' The Court noted that the criminal law is
deprived of much of its deterrent and retributive effect
without finality.161 Moreover, states traditionally have wide
latitude to articulate societal norms through criminal law;
federal courts should be hesitant to fashion new rules that
may undermine the legitimacy of valid state criminal
convictions. 62  Thus, the argument goes, "[wihile finality is
not the sole value in the criminal justice system, neither is it
subject to the kind of blunt abrogation that would occur with
the recognition of a due process entitlement to post-conviction
access to DNA evidence." 63
Those against constitutionalizing a right of access to
better resolved by legislatures).
156. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 375 (4th. Cir. 2002).
157. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
158. Harvey 1, 278 F.3d at 376.
159. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), superseded by statute,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-132,
§ 106(b), 110 Stat. 1214.
160. Id. at 491.
161. See id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989)).
162. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (quoting
McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 491).
163. Harvey 1, 278 F.3d at 376.
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DNA evidence post-conviction argue that if states wish to
create mechanisms by which state prisoners can gain access
to evidence for DNA testing, then state legislatures are free to
do so. 164 Indeed, legislatures have been quite active in this
area: forty-four states and the federal government have
statutes that allow for prisoners to access DNA evidence
under appropriate circumstances.' 65 To constitutionalize this
area would be to override these legislative efforts, treating
Congress, state legislatures, and state court systems as
subordinate in "determining the entitlements of individuals
to the fruits of scientific advances.' 66 In rather dramatic
fashion, Judge Wilkinson argued in Harvey II that this would
signify nothing less than "a loss of faith in democracy . ..
[claus[ing] legislatures across our nation to simply surrender
the impulse to innovate based on the assumption that the
federal courts are prepared to step in at any time.' 67
It is questionable whether Judge Wilkinson's ominous
forecast will come true in the event more courts recognize a
constitutional right to access DNA evidence post-conviction,
but there is something to be said for all the legislation
addressing the subject. The constitutional dimensions of the
post-conviction right to access evidence will develop in state
and federal courts for years. 6 8 The Supreme Court will likely
address the issue in the near future. In jurisdictions that
refuse to constitutionalize a post-conviction right to access
DNA evidence, or jurisdictions that have not yet addressed
the issue, the state and federal statutes can serve as "gap
fillers" for prisoners who wish to access evidence in the hands
of the government. In other words, prisoners may still have
an alternative remedy if the Supreme Court declines to afford
this right constitutional protection. Perhaps
constitutionalizing a post-conviction right to access DNA
164. See id. ("[Wie do not declare that criminal defendants should not be
allowed to avail themselves of advances in technology. Rather, our decision
reflects the core democratic ideal that if this entitlement is to be conferred, it
should be accomplished by legislative action rather than by a federal court as a
matter of constitutional right.").
165. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3600
(2006) (federal post-conviction DNA testing statute).
166. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I/), 285 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2002).
167. Id. at 303.
168. Only a few federal circuit courts and a handful of lower courts have
definitively ruled on the issue. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
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evidence, rather than signifying a "loss of faith" in
legislatures, simply adds another dimension-a constitutional
"floor"-below which legislation will not pass muster, but
above which lawmakers are free to create alternative
standards. 169
2. The Argument in Favor of Constitutionalizing a Post-
Conviction Right to Access DNA Evidence
Those who argue that the right to access evidence post-
conviction for DNA testing does have a constitutional
dimension emphasize that the advances of DNA technology
are no ordinary scientific developments.170 DNA evidence
can, in certain cases, exonerate criminal defendants-or those
wrongfully convicted-to a practical certainty.17' Thus, DNA
testing is categorically different from other types of
evidence. 17 2  Its unique qualities "justify a completely
different balance than the courts usually strike in addressing
[other] post-conviction challenges. '"1 73
Furthermore, proponents of recognizing a constitutional
right to post-conviction access to DNA evidence argue that
while the government has a legitimate interest in the finality
of its convictions, this interest cannot override those rare
circumstances where DNA evidence can conclusively prove
guilt or innocence. 174  After all, the criminal justice system
169. If the constitutional standard is as limited as some judges have
intimated it might be, see infra Part IV.C, then pursuing redress through a
state DNA access statute might be preferable. For example, California Penal
Code § 1405(c)(1)(B) provides that a motion requesting access to DNA evidence
will be granted upon a showing of, among other things, "how the requested DNA
testing would raise a reasonable probability that the convicted person's verdict
or sentence would be more favorable if the results of DNA testing had been
available at the time of conviction." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(c)(1)(B) (Deering
2008). If the constitutional right to access DNA evidence post conviction only
applies to "extraordinary circumstances," see Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328,
1339 (11th Cir. 2006), then the prisoner's probability of success will probably be
greater under the California statute.
170. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 305 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing
en banc); Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230-31 (D. Mass. 2006).
171. Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 305 n.1 (citing David J. Balding & Peter
Donnelly, Inferring Identity from DNA Profile Evidence, 92 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCi. 11741 (1995)).
172. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
173. Id. ("When the evidence is a new witness, or a recanted confession,... it
is [more] difficult to justify the cost of a further proceeding-the financial cost to
the government and the emotional cost to the victims.").
174. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 306.
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requires a very high degree of proof to convict, but it does not
require proof beyond all doubt.175 It would not be an
indictment upon the system to recognize that jury verdicts
can be fallible; to the contrary, it would be a "high credit" to
the system to recognize this reality and provide a
constitutional safety valve for those instances where DNA
science can potentially exonerate the innocent. 176  The
government has an interest in finality, but it does not have an
interest in imprisoning the wrong person. 177
The aforementioned arguments, both for and against
recognizing a constitutional right to access DNA evidence
post-conviction, are essentially policy arguments. They
reflect judges' differing views on the proper role of courts.
Those against recognizing the right are apprehensive about
aggressive federal judges engaging in prescriptive lawmaking
and usurping the proper role of legislatures. 78  Proponents
for recognizing the right argue that DNA evidence is
unique-the evidentiary equivalent of a "watershed" rule of
constitutional law.179 Therefore, allowing prisoners access to
DNA evidence that may be crucial in challenging their
imprisonment in the future must have constitutional
implications.10 More and more judges are acknowledging
that there must be some constitutional right: at some point
along the continuum where a prisoner is seeking access to
evidence and the government is steadfastly refusing to turn it
over, there must be constitutional implications."" The
inquiry then focuses upon how to best characterize the right,
and at what point along the continuum the constitutional
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 248-49.
178. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 301.
179. Id. at 306 (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (citing
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
180. See id. at 306.
181. See, e.g., Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne
If), 521 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008);
Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1339 (11th Cir. 2006); Godschalk v.
Montgomery County Dist. Att'y's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa.
2001); Breest v. N.H. Att'y Gen., 472 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.N.H. 2007); Wade
v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass. 2006); Bryson v. Macy, No. CIV-05-
1150-F, 2007 WL 682030, at *4-5 (W.D. Okla. March 1, 2007), rev'd in part,
Bryson v. Gonzalez, 534 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2008).
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claim becomes actionable. 18 2
B. How to Characterize the Right to Access DNA Evidence
Post-Conviction
1. The Due Process Backdrop
The Supreme Court has often remarked that due
process, 8 3 unlike some legal rules, is not technical, but rather
is a fluid concept "adaptable to the exigencies of a particular
factual context."" Along this line of reasoning, the Court has
developed "what might loosely be called the area of
constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence."18 5 Although
the Court has never expressly ruled that a post-conviction
constitutional right to access DNA evidence exists, it has not
foreclosed the possibility either. 1 6 The Court has, however,
repeatedly stated the maxim that the central purpose of the
criminal justice system is to convict the guilty and free the
innocent. 187 Therefore, if, as Justice Harlan famously posited,
"it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free,"88 then the reality of wrongful convictions must
"challenge[U us to reaffirm our commitment to the principle
that the innocent should be freed."8 9
2. Due Process and the Brady v. Maryland Analogy
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that
suppression of evidence by the prosecution favorable to the
defendant is a violation of due process if the evidence is
material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the good faith
182. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 231 n.6.
183. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V; "No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
184. Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 243; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334 (1976); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 12 (1979).
185. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (quoting United States
v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
186. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
187. See, e.g, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-25 (1995); Trombetta, 467
U.S. at 485.
188. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
189. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen 1), 481 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).
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or bad faith of the prosecution.1 90 Evidence is considered
"material" if there is a "reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result in the
proceeding would have been different." '' A "reasonable
probability" is a "probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." '92  The underlying principle
behind Brady and its progeny is that the chief aim of the
criminal justice system is not only to convict the guilty but to
ensure that the innocent are not wrongfully convicted. 193
Section 1983 plaintiffs seeking post-conviction access to
DNA evidence have argued that Brady, which has
traditionally applied to discovery before and during trial,194
extends to the post-conviction context as well. They argue
that Brady did not foreclose the possibility that the
prosecutor has a similar duty to disclose evidence in the post-
conviction context, 95 and that the Court has expanded the
Brady doctrine in other contexts.19 6 However, the Court has
been quite reluctant to revisit factual determinations of guilt
or innocence after conviction in the habeas corpus context. 197
The Court has observed that the determination of guilt is a
"decisive and portentous event," 98 and reexamining a jury's
factual determination after the passage of time "only
diminishes the reliability of criminal adjudications."'99
In Harvey I, Judge Wilkinson rejected the extension of
Brady to the post-conviction context, instead considering
Harvey's § 1983 claim "as one brought in habeas corpus."200
190. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
191. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
192. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
193. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I), 285 F.3d 298, 316 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,
J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976)).
194. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 316; Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 247
(D. Mass. 2006).
195. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 315.
196. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 245. These other contexts include: "where
the evidence is of obvious value to the defense," Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110;
revealing the contents of a plea agreement with major government witnesses,
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); disclosure of impeachment
evidence, Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676; and information held by police but unknown
to prosecutors, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
197. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993).
198. Id. at 401 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S 72, 90 (1977)).
199. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403.
200. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2002).
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The Fourth Circuit concluded that since Harvey had received
a fair trial and had an opportunity to test the evidence using
the best technology available at the time of trial, he had not
stated a valid Brady claim. 20 1 Then, somewhat paradoxically,
the court pronounced "even were we to accept Harvey's
analogy to Brady, it would only reinforce the conclusion that
Harvey is bringing a habeas action rather than a § 1983 claim
because Brady claims are typically raised in habeas
petitions. 2 2  Therefore, since the court was unwilling to
accept Harvey's extension of Brady principles to the post-
conviction context, it took the initiative to transform his §
1983 claim into a writ of habeas corpus.0 3
Similarly, in Grayson v. King, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the Brady analogy.20 4 The court agreed with the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Harvey I, stating that Brady
only applies to the suppression of evidence prior to and
during trial.20 5  The court again emphasized that the
petitioner received a fair trial at which the evidence was
available and presented.20 6 Thus, the court analyzed the
petitioner's § 1983 claim within the specific procedural
confines of Brady. Finding that it did not fit, the court
rejected the petitioner's Brady analogy.20 7
In Wade v. Brady, an influential case from the District
Court of Massachusetts, Judge Gertner criticized the narrow
view of Brady by characterizing it as an approach that
"subordinate [s] the pursuit of justice to an arid obsession with
procedure."208  In accepting the post-conviction Brady
analogue, Judge Gertner argued that, under a more fluid
concept of due process, "the same interest that motivated
Brady-avoiding the wrongful conviction of the innocent-
still applies in the post-conviction setting .. ."209 She
conceded that restricting Brady to pre-trial discovery may
201. Id. at 378-79.
202. Id. at 379.
203. Id.
204. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006); accord Alley v.
Key, No. 06-5552, 2006 WL 1313364, at *2 (6th Cir. May 14, 2006).
205. Grayson, 460 F.3d at 1337.
206. Id. at 1338.
207. Id. at 1339-40.
208. Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass. 2006).
209. Id. at 247-48.
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have made sense before the advent of DNA.21° But, unlike the
"perceived unreliability of most new evidence," such as new
witness testimony or a recanted confession, DNA evidence
"fundamentally alters the traditional Due Process
calculus."211 No longer, as the Supreme Court earlier stated
in Herrera v. Collins,"2 is the determination of guilt or
innocence solely "within the limits of human fallibility."21 3
Other courts have since agreed with Judge Gertner's
analysis of Brady in the post-conviction context." 4  In
Osborne v. District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial
District (Osborne II), the Ninth Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to recognize a post-conviction right to
access DNA evidence.1 5 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
applied the Brady rationale to the post-conviction context.216
The court juxtaposed cases that have recognized a post-
conviction right to access DNA evidence with those that have
not.2 7 Finding the latter line of cases more persuasive, and
relying on a previous habeas case within the circuit,218 the
210. Id. at 248.
211. Id.
212. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
213. Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 401).
214. See, e.g., Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne
I!), 521 F.3d 1118, 1128-32 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008);
Breest v. N.H. Att'y Gen., 472 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120-21 (D.N.H. 2007); Bryson v.
Macy, No. CIV-05-1150-F, 2007 WL 682030, at *5 (W.D. Okla. March 1, 2007),
rev'd in part, Bryson v. Gonzalez, 534 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2008).
215. Osborne 11, 521 F.3d at 1132.
216. Id. at 1128-32.
217. Id. at 1131-32. The court noted that cases which do not recognize the
right share two basic commonalities: they conflate the right of access to
evidence with the ultimate right to habeas relief, and they read Brady and its
progeny as applicable only in the trial context. Id. at 1131 (citing Osborne v.
State, 110 P.3d 986, 992 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I),
278 F.3d 370, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2002); Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1137,
1342 (11th Cir. 2006)). The court then observed that cases which do recognize
the right distinguish between the right to access evidence and habeas relief, and
extend Brady due process principles to the post-conviction context. Id. at 1131-
32 (citing Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 11,) 285 F.3d 298, 322-24 (4th Cir. 2002);
Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 246 (D. Mass. 2006); Moore v. Lockyer, No.
C 04-1952 MHP, 2005 WL 2334350, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2005)).
218. See Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1992). In Thomas v.
Goldsmith, the Ninth Circuit ordered disclosure of potentially exculpatory
biological evidence in a habeas proceeding where the defendant sought to use
the evidence to make a "gateway" showing of actual innocence. Id. at 749-50.
The court expressly applied Brady to find a post-conviction right in the habeas
context. Id. In Osborne II, the court rejected the government's efforts to
distinguish Thomas and extended the reasoning in Thomas to the § 1983
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Ninth Circuit vindicated Judge Gertner's Brady analysis,
emphasizing that Brady stands for "fundamental fairness, the
prosecutor's obligation to do justice rather than simply obtain
convictions, and the constitutional imperatives of protecting
the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring the
integrity of our criminal justice system."219 Thus, in rejecting
a narrow reading of Brady, the Ninth Circuit held that
petitioner Osborne was entitled to assert a post-conviction
due process right under § 1983 to access potentially
exculpatory DNA evidence.22°
Osborne II and Wade will be pivotal decisions for
proponents of recognizing a right to post-conviction access to
DNA evidence. Judge Gertner provides the most thorough
and convincing articulation of the rationale behind extending
Brady due process requirements to the post-conviction
context.221  Nonetheless, courts are still fairly split on the
222issue. But, given that the Brady analogy is probably the
most apt constitutional argument for recognizing a post-
conviction right to DNA evidence,223 the issue will continue to
be litigated. Judge Gertner's analysis may give other courts
the ammunition they need to tilt the balance in favor of
analogizing the Brady due process right to the post-conviction
context.
3. Mathews v. Eldridge and Procedural Due Process
Section 1983 plaintiffs may also frame their
constitutional claim in terms of procedural due process. Due
process requires such procedural safeguards as the particular
situation demands.224 Procedural adequacy is required only
to protect substantive rights; one does not possess an interest
in mere process without any underlying substantive
interest.225  In the context of post-conviction access to DNA
evidence, procedural due process entails the "right to have
context. See Osborne 11, 521 F.3d at 1128-32.
219. Osborne 11, 521 F.3d at 1131-32 (internal quotations omitted).
220. Id. at 1132.
221. See generally Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 243-49.
222. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
223. Brief for Appellee at 18-19, Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. v.
Osborne, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06 Civ. 35875).
224. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
225. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 315 (4th Cir. 2002)
(Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
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previously-produced forensic evidence either released to the
convicted individual for . . .DNA testing at his or her own
expense, or submitted by the government for such testing,
with the test results to be provided thereafter to the convicted
individual."22 6  In effect, then, the government would be
required to take certain actions in order to protect the
prisoner's substantive interest in testing potentially
exculpatory DNA evidence.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court indicated
three factors to consider in analyzing a procedural due
process claim.27  Before consideration of these factors,
however, one must prove that government action or policy has
deprived him of an interest in life, liberty, or property.228
Once an interest has been identified, a court must consider
three distinct factors to determine what procedure is "due":
first, the private interest that will be affected by government
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, including the probative
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedures; and
third, the government's interest, including fiscal and
administrative burden that the procedural requirement
would entail.229
The prisoner arguably has a liberty interest in pursuing
freedom by gaining access to evidence that could prove
beyond all doubt that he did not commit the crime for which
he was convicted. 2 0 The risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest-if the prisoner has such a substantive liberty
interest-is apparently high. If the government does not turn
over the evidence, then the prisoner will likely be deprived of
his interest in pursuing DNA testing and possibly future
exoneration. However, the second prong of the Mathews
framework takes into account the probative value of
substitute procedural safeguards, which, in this case, may
226. Id.
227. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
228. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
229. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
230. See Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 247 n.37 (D. Mass. 2006);
Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 314-15; McKithen v. Brown (McKithen I), 481 F.3d 89,
106-07 (2d Cir. 2007); but see McKithen v. Brown (McKithen II), 565 F. Supp.
2d 440, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ("[Pjrisoners do not have liberty interests in release
from custody before the end of valid sentences.").
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depend upon the availability of statutory relief.231 If statutory
relief is available, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty
may be mitigated.232 As to the third prong, the government's
interest is essentially twofold: it has an interest in
maintaining the finality of criminal convictions, and it will
incur fiscal costs in turning over the evidence to the prisoner
and perhaps also the cost of performing the DNA testing
itself.23 Balancing these factors is inevitably a fact-intensive
inquiry, which may include considering the seriousness of the
crime for which the prisoner was convicted, whether the
prisoner has been sentenced to death or is only seeking
earlier release from prison, and the potential availability of
other means of relief.234
McKithen v. Brown (McKithen II) provides a thorough
analysis of the post-conviction "liberty" interest and
application of the Mathews framework.235  The court
considered "whether this residual post-conviction liberty
interest encompasses an interest in accessing or possessing
potentially exonerative biological evidence." 236 Writing for the
Eastern District of New York, Judge Gleeson emphasized
that "liberty" in the context of procedural due process is a
technical term, synonymous with a "conditional
entitlement."237  With that in mind, the court entertained
several potential grounds for finding that prisoners might
retain a liberty interest in acquiring DNA evidence after
conviction. 238
The court concluded first that, at least in noncapital
231. McKithen I, 481 F.3d at 108 n.18.
232. See id.
233. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 248-49 (citing Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 538, 555-56 (1998)) ("[Tlhe interest in finality is, in reality, an amalgam of
several interests, namely: retribution, deterrence, the quality of judging, and
the interest of victims in finality.").
234. See McKithen 1, 481 F.3d at 107-08.
235. McKithen 11, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 452-58.
236. Id. at 453 (citing McKithen I, 481 F.3d at 106-07). The appellate court
in McKithen I directed the district court on remand to consider the contours of a
post-conviction right to access DNA evidence. Id.
237. Id. at 452. The court explained, "[a] conditional entitlement is called an
'interest' for the purposes of procedural due process analysis, so that a 'liberty
interest' in taking some action is a legal entitlement to take that action under
certain conditions." Id. at 451. Procedural due process rights, then, "are the
rights to appropriate procedures to determine if the individual possessing an
interest satisfies the conditions for the entitlement." Id.
238. Id. at 453.
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cases, a duly convicted prisoner does not have a liberty
interest-or a "conditional entitlement"-in pursuing release
from custody before his sentence expires.23 Judge Gleeson
reasoned the conviction itself, with all its procedural
safeguards, extinguishes a prisoner's entitlement to pursue
freedom. 240 However, the court ultimately did conclude that
where the government chooses to provide executive clemency,
statutory relief, or other relief that may provide post-
conviction access to the courts, a convicted prisoner retains a
liberty interest entitling him to meaningful access to these
mechanisms. 241' The court used the Mathews factors to
determine the scope of "meaningful access.2 42 The Mathews
analysis led the court to conclude that "meaningful access"
means where a state has a clemency mechanism in place,
including a parole system, the government must provide
access to DNA evidence if "the testing is nonduplicative[,] and
assuming exculpatory results, the results of the test would
undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial."2 43  Thus,
the court defined the applicable procedural due process
standard where the prisoner is found to have a recognized
239. Id. at 457. The court acknowledged, "an innocent prisoner has a
tremendous and justifiable interest, in any nontechnical sense of the term, in
release from prison." Id. at 457 n.19 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321
(1995)) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the court held that a prisoner-even an
innocent prisoner-does not have a conditional entitlement to be released from
prison before the end of his sentence, only a "unilateral hope." Id. at 457 n.19
(citing Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981)).
240. McKithen v. Brown (McKithen I/), 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 455 (E.D.N.Y.
2008). For a further discussion of what the contours of a post-conviction liberty
interest might be see infra Part IV.B.4.
241. Id. at 485. It is worth noting here that the court refused to extend
Brady due process to the post-conviction context, even though it did not entirely
discount the significance of Brady. See id. at 462-64. The court's Brady
determination, coupled with its refusal to find a residual liberty interest to
pursue freedom from confinement, can be read to mean that the court is
hesitant to find an independent due process right of post-conviction access to
DNA evidence. See id. at 495 ("Our legal system continues to grapple with the
questions of which avenues of relief remain open to those advancing claims that
they are wrongfully convicted ... it is unclear whether there is a constitutional
right [under § 1983]."). In other words, from the court's perspective, due process
principles are only implicated where the government denies the prisoner
meaningful access to pursue government-created rights. See id. An exception,
however, is that a prisoner may be able to assert a freestanding substantive due
process claim when the government acts in a way that "shocks the conscience."
See generally id. at 485-92.
242. See id. at 480-85.
243. Id. at 485.
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liberty interest.
4. Substantive Due Process and a "Residual Liberty
Interest"
The procedural due process inquiry ensures that
adequate procedures are in place to protect a litigant's
substantive rights.2" The Mathews test applies only where
the prisoner has a recognized liberty interest that the
government seeks to eliminate.2 45  Therefore, the prisoner
may seek to establish a freestanding substantive due process
right and then argue the government's procedures in
protecting that right are inadequate. If he has no cognizable
substantive right, then it follows that he has no cognizable
procedural right either.2 46  But in Harvey II, Judge Luttig
explained that a constitutional right to access DNA evidence
post-conviction does not fit squarely into either substantive or
procedural due process as those concepts are "classically
understood."2 47 Rather, "it is a right that legitimately draws
upon the principles that underlay [both]-a conceptual and
constitutional fact that [is] understandably elu[sive]. ''248
Therefore, procedural and substantive due process arguments
in this context are not neatly separable.
Nonetheless, one can think of a prisoner's substantive
due process interest in accessing evidence as a residual
liberty interest that the prisoner retains even after he has
been properly convicted and sentenced. 249  The Supreme
Court has held that "the mere fact that [one] has been
committed under proper procedures does not deprive him of
all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment."250  The extent of that liberty may be
"indeterminate," but it arguably includes "many of the core
244. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
245. See supra notes 225, 227-29 and accompanying text.
246. See Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1340-41 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
Ohio Adult Parole Auth. Bd. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998)) (discussing
whether a liberty interest residually survives under the due process clause after
final conviction and sentencing); Harvey v. Horan (Harvey If), 285 F.3d 298, 315
n.5 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (citing
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983)) (noting that one does not possess a
liberty interest in mere process, absent any substantive interest).
247. Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 310-11.
248. Id. at 311.
249. Id. at 312.
250. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (citation omitted).
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values of unqualified liberty."251 While liberty certainly
includes freedom from arbitrary bodily restraint,1 2 the issue
is whether it includes the freedom to pursue freedom from
confinement, albeit a "freedom" in an obviously reduced
form.25 3 As noted above, Judge Gleeson in McKithen If
rejected this extension of a liberty interest to pursue freedom
from confinement.254 But other courts disagree, finding such
an interest may exist under limited circumstances.255
The Supreme Court's position regarding whether there is
any interest in pursuing freedom from confinement is not
clear.256 It may be the case that "one's liberty interest 'in
being free from confinement' is 'extinguished' once he has
been lawfully convicted and sentenced. '257  However, due
process still protects the individual from completely arbitrary
government actions, regardless of whether he has been
lawfully convicted.258 The government's steadfast denial of
mere access to evidence can be deemed patently arbitrary in
the absence of any governmental interest whatsoever in
withholding such evidence.259 Indeed, this argument may be
particularly strong where the prisoner can pay for the DNA
testing; the government simply has to turn over the evidence
with only nominal administrative costs. 26°  However,
substantive due process is a murky area of constitutional law,
and the issue of whether a convicted prisoner has a "residual
251. Harvey 1I, 285 F.3d at 312 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
482 (1972)).
252. See Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 313.
254. See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 314; Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d
226, 247 n.37 (D. Mass. 2006).
256. See Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 313-14.
257. Id. at 313 (quoting Ohio Adult Parole Auth. Bd. v. Woodard, 523 U.S.
272, 288-89 (1998)).
258. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
259. Harvey 11, 285 F.3d at 319 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (describing arbitrary governmental action as including "the
exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a
legitimate governmental objective"); accord Moore v. Lockyer, No. C 04-1952
MHP, 2005 WL 2334350, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2005) ("To permit the state to
deny a convicted defendant access to evidence that could prove his or her
innocence for no reason whatsoever, under any and all circumstances, would
undoubtedly be contrary to this [due process] principle.").
260. See Brief for Appellee at 27-29, Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud.
Dist. v. Osborne, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 06 Civ. 35875).
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liberty interest" may be foreclosed by precedent.2 61  But
arguably, the right to access DNA evidence post-conviction,
pursuant to society's interest that the innocent are not
wrongfully convicted, is rooted sufficiently in the history and
traditions of the criminal justice system to be deemed
"fundamental" for due process purposes.2 62 If this is the case,
then a prisoner may have a substantive due process right in
accessing DNA evidence.
5. Meaningful Access to the Courts
Finally, a § 1983 plaintiff may argue that by denying him
access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence, the
government is denying him meaningful access to the courts.26 3
The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that meaningful
access to the courts is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution . 4 This means
whether an access [to the courts] claim turns on a
litigating opportunity yet to be gained or an opportunity
already lost, the very point of recognizing any access [to
the courts] claim is to provide some effective vindication
for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for
some wrong.265
Therefore, if a prisoner has an independent and colorable
claim to access DNA evidence, then the courts must provide
him sufficient access.266 Here, the prisoner can argue that by
denying him access to evidence, the state is denying him
access to the tools "need[ed] in order to attack [his]
sentence[], directly or collaterally," which the state is
constitutionally required to do. 267 Therefore, denying access
to DNA evidence that may potentially prove the prisoner's
innocence essentially imposes an absolute bar to the
prisoner's future intention to challenge his sentence or
261. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.
1, 7 (1979) ("There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.").
262. Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249-50 (D. Mass. 2006).
263. See, e.g., id.
264. See, e.g., Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002); Bounds
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
265. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414-15.
266. This is the rationale the court followed in McKithen H. See supra notes
241-43 and accompanying text.
267. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996).
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confinement.268
In sum, a § 1983 plaintiff may characterize a
constitutional entitlement to access DNA evidence in multiple
ways: as a Brady claim 269 or as a freestanding substantive
due process claim, 27° both of which may provide the basis to
assert a procedural due process violation.2 1' He may also
characterize the right as a claim that meaningful access to
the courts has been denied . 2" No matter how the prisoner
characterizes his constitutional right, the right cannot be
absolute and can be trumped by competing government
interests. Therefore, the prisoner must make the requisite
showing that his interest is sufficiently high to gain access to
the DNA evidence he seeks.274
C. The Constitutional Standard
Those courts that have recognized a constitutional right
to access evidence post-conviction for DNA testing have not
provided extensive guidance as to what the standard should
be for asserting such a right. Certainly, there are many cases
where DNA evidence is only tangential to the finding of guilt,
and even a favorable test result would probably have no
impact on the verdict.275 If every prisoner could assert a
constitutional right to re-test every piece of evidence that may
be only slightly relevant, then courts would be overwhelmed
and criminal adjudications would be in a perpetual state of
uncertainty.276 It is necessary, then, to develop a test that
requires some threshold showing that the evidence sought to
be tested is sufficiently probative of guilt or innocence. The
inquiry becomes, "at what point . . . does the due process
interest become actionable?" 277
Judicial responses to this question have been quite
ethereal thus far. In Harvey II, Judge Luttig provided a
detailed analysis of the constitutional right at issue, but then
268. Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
269. See discussion supra Part LV.B.2.
270. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
271. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
272. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
273. See Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
274. See discussion infra Part 1V.C.
275. Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 231 n.6.
276. See Harvey v. Horan (Harvey 1), 278 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2002).
277. Wade, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 231 n.6.
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went on to conclude simply that he "would very narrowly
confine the right," without providing any more guidance.
Judge Beistline, writing for the District Court of Alaska,
seemed to agree with this result, holding that "under the
unique and specific facts presented [there exists] a very
limited constitutional right to the testing sought."' 7 Judge
Hull, writing for the Eleventh Circuit, seemed unwilling to
recognize a constitutional right to access DNA evidence post-
conviction, but then stated rather cryptically that there may
be such a right under "extraordinary circumstances."
280
A few courts have been a little more specific, seeming to
embrace the Brady "materiality" standard.28 ' In Osborne II,
the Ninth Circuit had a direct opportunity to define the
contours of the post-conviction Brady standard, but declined
to do so.2 82 However, the court did hold that the materiality
standard in the post-conviction context is no higher than a
reasonable probability that, if the exculpatory DNA evidence
were disclosed, Osborne could prevail in an action for post-
conviction relief.28 ' This standard, the court explained, did
not require Osborne to show by a preponderance of evidence
that disclosure of the evidence would enable him to prove his
278. Harvey v. Horan (Harvey II), 285 F.3d 298, 321 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,
J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc). To Judge Luttig's credit, the issue
certainly was not ripe for decision; he felt it to be prudential not to define the
contours of the right at that juncture. Id. at 320-21.
279. Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist., 445 F. Supp. 2d
1079, 1081 (D. Alaska 2006).
280. Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1339 (11th Cir. 2006).
281. See Breest v. N.H. Att'y Gen., 472 F. Supp. 2d 116, 121 (D.N.H. 2007)
("To the extent there is a reasonable probability that the results of the DNA
testing requested.., would have affected the outcome ... I conclude that he has
alleged a cognizable due process claim."); Moore v. Lockyer, No. C 04-1952
MHP, 2005 WL 2334350, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2005) ("[Tlhe court may
safely assume that the 'reasonable probability' standard set forth in Bagley
establishes the outer limits of a state prisoner's right to obtain post-conviction
access to DNA evidence."); Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Att'y's Office,
177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 369 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("[In considering whether plaintiff is
entitled to biological evidence under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we must employ the standard set by the Supreme Court in Brady .
282. Osborne v. Dist. Att'y's Office for the Third Jud. Dist. (Osborne I/), 521
F.3d 1118, 1134 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008) ("The
precise height at which the materiality bar should be set is largely an academic
question, which we may leave to another day and another case that truly
presses the issue.").
283. Id.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
innocence.284 It is not clear whether the Ninth Circuit would
accept a standard lower than the "reasonable probability"
standard; the court concluded, "wherever the bar is,
[Osborne] crosses it."285  Judge Gertner, writing for the
District Court of Massachusetts, did appear to embrace a
lower standard.28 6  She stated, "[b]ecause DNA testing can
exonerate the defendant, the government may only
legitimately deny access to testing if it has a compelling
reason to do so." 28 7 However, she went on to say that "the
question of what the appropriate standard may be ... is not
properly before the Court."28 1
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, courts have
not articulated definitively what constitutional "test" a
prisoner seeking post-conviction access to DNA evidence must
satisfy. Given the importance of the issue, there needs to be a
workable standard specific enough so that prisoners seeking
access to evidence will have guidance in preparing to litigate
their claims.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: POST-CONVICTION
ACCESS TO DNA EVIDENCE AND A MODIFIED BRADY
STANDARD
The most straightforward and logical way to harmonize
the various due process arguments that prisoners may assert
in seeking access to DNA evidence is to recognize that the
government has a duty, be it pre-trial, during trial, or post-
conviction, to disclose material, potentially exculpatory
evidence to the defendant. The standard articulated in Brady
and its progeny289 should extend to the post-conviction
context. Courts recognizing as much are correct in their
analysis.2 90 However, courts must take into account that the
prisoner has been duly convicted and sentenced and thus, has
lost many of the due process rights that are attendant to
unqualified liberty.291 Courts must also take into account the
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Wade v. Brady, 460 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass. 2006).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 249.
289. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
290. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
291. See generally discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
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fact that the government's burden in allowing access to DNA
evidence is usually modest. Thus, a "modified Brady
approach" is the best solution.
I propose a modified post-conviction Brady standard that
incorporates a burden-shifting approach. First, the petitioner
would have the burden of showing that the DNA test results,
if favorable, would indicate a reasonable possibility that, had
the results been presented at trial, the outcome would have
been different. This burden is less onerous than a
"reasonable probability" standard; it would only require the
petitioner to show that the biological evidence, if presented at
trial, would be an "important" factor. The petitioner would be
able to meet this burden by, for example, showing that
identity was an issue at trial292 and that the biological
evidence, if presented, would have been a considerable factor
in creating reasonable doubt. At this initial stage, the court
should deny the petitioner's claim only if, in light of all the
remaining evidence, there is a strong indication of guilt. If
the petitioner meets his initial burden, then the burden
would shift to the government, which would be required to
articulate an "important" reason for withholding the
evidence. The government may be able to make this showing
by, for example, demonstrating that the petitioner already
made successive and potentially frivolous requests for testing,
that the particular method of testing was available at trial,2 93
or that producing the evidence would be significantly cost-
prohibitive or administratively impracticable. If the
government satisfies its burden, then the burden would shift
back to the petitioner, who would have the ultimate burden of
proving that the biological evidence was a predominant factor
in the government's case. This would require showing by a
preponderance of evidence that the test results, if favorable,
would have led to an acquittal.
It must be emphasized that these § 1983 cases inevitably
will involve a certain amount of judicial discretion. Judges
292. If, for example, the defendant was tried for rape and he asserted a
consent defense, then identity was not "at issue;" DNA testing would not show
whether or not the victim consented. On the other hand, if the defendant
alleged that he never had sexual contact with the victim, then identity would be
at issue: DNA testing may conclusively prove the defendant's innocence.
293. If the testing was available, but the evidence was not tested, then the
plaintiff may have to allege another constitutional violation, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel, rather than using § 1983 as a backdoor.
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should have considerable leeway in weighing the particular
facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether
post-trial DNA testing is warranted. It is not possible, nor
desirable, to formulate a mechanical test applicable to each
and every factual scenario without consideration of basic
fairness and justice. Nevertheless, a modified post-conviction
Brady approach provides a workable framework to adjudicate
§ 1983 cases in a manner that is just for the prisoner and the
government.
VI. CONCLUSION
I argue there is a post-conviction due process analogue to
the Brady v. Maryland "materiality" standard.2 94 In reaching
this conclusion, I first outlined the "Preiser-Heck" procedural
bar and concluded that the doctrine is most likely
inapplicable to § 1983 suits to access DNA evidence.295 I next
considered the pros and cons of "constitutionalizing" a right to
access DNA evidence.296 Judicial philosophy as to what role
the courts should play in interpreting the Constitution will
significantly guide judicial decisionmaking in this area.2 97
Courts that have considered the issue have characterized the
right in different ways.29  The best way to analyze a post-
conviction claim to access DNA evidence is to utilize a
modified Brady standard.299
The issue of whether there is a constitutional right to
access DNA evidence post-conviction will continue to be
litigated in the future. The recognition of such a right
undoubtedly would have large implications for prisoners
seeking to prove their innocence. In the meantime, many
states have mechanisms in place for prisoners to access
evidence under appropriate circumstances. °° Many of these
mechanisms, however, impose a much more stringent
standard than the modified Brady standard proposed in this
comment. A federal due process standard would rightly
294. See supra Part V.
295. See supra Part II.
296. See supra Parts III-IV.A.
297. See supra Parts III-IV.A.
298. See supra Part IV.B.
299. See supra Part V.
300. See The Innocence Project, supra note 8; see also McKithen v. Brown
(McKithen I), 565 F. Supp. 2d 440, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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acknowledge the true uniqueness of DNA evidence and would
create a level of equality for prisoners across the United
States.

